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Abstract. Group signature schemes allow a user to sign a message in
an anonymous way on behalf of a group. In general, these schemes need
the collaboration of a Key Generation Center or a Trusted Third Party,
which can disclose the identity of the actual signer if necessary (for exam-
ple, in order to settle a dispute). This paper presents the results obtained
after implementing a group signature scheme using the Integer Factoriza-
tion Problem and the Subgroup Discrete Logarithm Problem, which has
allowed us to check the feasibility of the scheme when using big numbers.
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1 Introduction
The concept of group signatures was rst proposed by Chaum and van Heyst
in 1991 [1]. Group signatures allow a certain group to sign a message such that
only one member of the group computes the signature on behalf of the whole
group.
The main properties that must satisfy a group signature scheme are the
following:
(i) Only one member signs the message on behalf of the group.
(ii) The receiver of the message can verify that its associated signature was
generated by a member of the signer group, but he or she cannot determine
which member of the group was the actual signer.
(iii) In case it is necessary, it must be possible to determine which group member
was the actual signer of the message.
There exist several proposals involving group signatures and their applica-
bility to dierent scenarios (e.g, [2{7]). Some of these proposals need a Key
Generation Center (KGC), denoted by C, or a Trusted Third Party (TTP), de-
noted by T , at least for the initialization process. Other schemes, however, allow
any user to create the group they choose to belong to. The actions performed
by C and T are similar and, for this reason, the roles of both entities are usually
considered equivalent.
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As a general rule, the cryptographic primitives used by those proposals base
their security on computationally-intractable mathematical problems such as the
Integer Factorization Problem (IFP) and the Subgroup Discrete Logarithm Prob-
lem (SDLP). As it is well known, the IFP can be described as follows [8]: Given
a positive integer n, nd its prime factorization; that is, write n = pe11 p
e2
2    pekk
where the pi are pairwise distinct primes and each ei  1. Besides, the SDLP
is dened as follows [8]: Let p be a prime and q a prime divisor of p   1. Let
us consider g a generator of the unique subgroup G of Zp of order q, and y an
element in G. The problem is that of computing the integer x, 0  x  q   1,
such that y = gx (mod p).
For example, the schemes described in [9{14] base their security in the ran-
dom oracle model, the strong RSA problem and the Decisional (bilinear) Die-
Hellman problem. Other schemes, such as [15{17], are identity-based group sig-
nature protocols. They mainly use bilinear maps, such as bilinear pairings, which
tend to be heavy in terms of computational load. In our case, we have employed
a construction based on the SDLP which is dierent to those proposed in the
aforementioned references.
This work presents the results obtained when implementing a modied ver-
sion of a group signature scheme previously designed by one of the authors [18].
The goal of the modication, as it will become clear when describing the scheme,
is to facilitate the implementation in devices with limited resources [19, 20]. In
our scheme, G = fU1; U2; : : : ; Utg is the group of users allowed to perform signa-
tures. Those users share a public key, and at the same time they have dierent
private keys. When a signature is needed, the element playing the role of the
KGC, C, randomly chooses a member of the group so that member can perform
the signature on behalf of G. After that, the verier of the signature can check
if the signature was performed by one of the members of G by using the public
key that all members share. Without further information, the verier will not
be able to identify who was the original signer, unless the verier is the PKC.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, a detailed de-
scription of the group signature scheme is included. Section 3 describes the Java
application developed in order to test the feasibility of the scheme. In Section 4,
we oer to the readers the experimental results obtained with that application.
Finally, our conclusions are presented in section 5.
2 Description of the scheme
Let G = fU1; U2; : : : ; Utg be the group of users allowed to perform signatures,
and C the element acting as the Key Generation Center. The following subsec-
tions describe all the details of the group signature scheme.
2.1 Setup phase
In this phase, C generates the system parameters, its own private key, the public
key shared by the group, and the private keys of all members of G [21]. The
steps that C must complete are the following ones:
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1. C chooses two large primes p and q, such that p = u1rp1+1 and q = u2rq1+1,
where r; p1; q1 are prime numbers and u1; u2 2 Z with gcd(u1; u2) = 2; that
is, u1 = 2v1, u2 = 2v2, where v1 and v2 are prime numbers. In the original
version [18], v1 and v2 could be composite numbers; we have introduced this
modication so that the number of factors of (n) (see next step) does not
depend on v1 and v2, which improves the iteration through the divisors of
(n) in the third step.
In order to guarantee the security of the scheme, the bit length of r is selected
so that the SDLP of order r in Zn is computationally infeasible.
2. C computes the values n = pq, (n) = (p   1)(q   1) = u1u2r2p1q1, and
(n) = lcm(p  1; q  1) = 2v1v2rp1q1, where (n) is the Euler function and
(n) is the Carmichael function.
3. C selects an element  2 Zn with multiplicative order r modulo n, such that
gcd(; (n)) = 1. The element  can be eciently computed as C knows the
factorization of n and consequently it knows (n) and (n).
In practice, it is enough to nd a random value g 2 Zn such that g(n)  1
(mod n) and check that none of the 62 non-trivial divisors of (n) are the
actual order of g [21]. By non-trivial divisor we mean a divisor of (n)
dierent from 1 or (n). The number of non-trivial divisors of (n) is derived
from the fact that (n) = 2v1v2rp1q1 and all the factors are prime numbers.
Once the value g is found, the generator is obtained through the following
computation [21]:
 = g(n)=r (mod n):
4. C generates a secret random number s 2 Zr and determines
 = s (mod n):
5. C publishes the values n, r, , and , while the elements p, q, and s are kept
secret.
6. C sets its private key by generating four random numbers a0; b0; c0; d0 2 Zr .
7. C determines the shared public key for G by computing
P = a0b0 (mod n) = a0+sb0 (mod n);
Q = c0d0 (mod n) = c0+sd0 (mod n):
8. C computes the integers h; k 2 Zr such that h = a0 + sb0 (mod r) and
k = c0 + sd0 (mod r).
9. C determines the private key for each signer Ui 2 G, 1  i  t, where each
private key is the tuple (ai; bi; ci; di) and ai; bi; ci; di 2 Zr.
In order to do that, C rst generates t pairs of random numbers, bi; di 2 Zr.
Then, it obtains the remaining elements by using the following equations:
ai = h  sbi (mod r); ci = k   sdi (mod r):
Once C has obtained the private keys of all the users, it distributes them to
the signers via some secure channel.
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2.2 Parameter and key verication
Each member of the signer group, Ui, 1  i  t, may check the parameters of
the system by verifying that  6= 1 (mod n) and r = 1 (mod n).
Moreover, each signer, Ui, 1  i  t, may verify that their private key is
related to the shared public key, by checking:
P = aibi (mod n); Q = cidi (mod n): (1)
2.3 Group signature generation
Let M be the message to be signed by a member of G. By using, for example,
a public hash function of the SHA-2 family [22], either the signing user or C
compute h(M) = m, where m represents the hash output.
In order to calculate the signature, Ui must obtain the values fi and gi that
compose the signature in this way:
fi = ai + cim (mod r); gi = bi + dim (mod r): (2)
After that, the group signature for the message M , which is (f; g) = (fi; gi),
can be published.
2.4 Group signature verication
Any verier knowing the message, M , the hash function, h, the public key of
the group G, (P;Q), and the group signature, (f; g), can check if the signature
is valid through the following computation:
PQm = fg (mod n): (3)
Equation (3) can be justied from expressions (1){(2):
fg (mod n) = ai+mcibi+mci = aibi
 
cidi
m
= PQm:
2.5 Disclosure of the signing user
In case it is necessary, C is able to verify the signature and determine the actual
signer, as C knows all the private keys of the users belonging to the group G.
If the original message is M , its associated hash code is m = h(M), and the
corresponding group signature is the pair (f; g), C needs to iterate the following
loop:
fi = ai + cim (mod r)
gi = bi + dim (mod r)

1  i  t; (4)
stopping whenever it nds an index j, such that ( fj ; gj) = (f; g). Using this
procedure, C determines that the actual signer was Uj .
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3 Java implementation of the scheme
The group signature scheme presented in this contribution has been implemented
as a Java application using Java SE 8. The application is composed of three
panels which are described in detail in the next subsections. In each panel, the
user has the option of converting the data from decimal (or text, in the case of
the message to be signed) to hexadecimal and vice versa.
In all the cases where a random number is needed, the application uses the
standard Java classes BigInteger [23] and Random [24], so the requested number
is obtained through the following code:
Random random = new Random();
BigInteger number = new BigInteger(numBits,random);
In the previous code, the element numBits indicates that the desired number
must be uniformly distributed over the range 0 to 2numBits   1. Regarding the
Random class, it uses a 48-bit seed which is modied using a linear congruential
formula according to the method described in Section 3.2.1 of [25].
Whenever a random prime number is needed, the following code is used after
obtaining a random number:
BigInteger prime = number.nextProbablePrime();
By calling the method nextProbablePrime() over the element number, the
application obtains the rst integer greater than number that is probably prime,
where the probability that the number returned is composite does not exceed
2 100 [23].
3.1 Parameters panel
This panel includes the general parameters, the KGC's private key and the
group's public key, as it can be seen in Figure 1. More specically, it includes
text boxes for the private elements p, q, s, a0, b0, c0, and d0 and the public
elements n, r, , , P , and Q.
There are four buttons available in this panel:
{ Generate: It computes all the parameters according to the steps 1-8 of the
procedure described in Section 2.1.
{ Save: It allows the user to save either the public data or all the data included
in this panel. The information is stored in a le using an XML structure.
{ Load : It allows the user to overwrite the data existing in the text boxes with
the information stored in the XML le selected by the user.
{ Clear : It deletes the content of all the text boxes pertaining to this panel.
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Fig. 1. View of the three panels of the application
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3.2 Users panel
This panel includes the private keys of the four users managed by this applica-
tion. It is important to point out that the number of users implemented in this
version of the application is not a limitation of the scheme, but a gure selected
in order to simplify the usage of the application. For each user from i = 1 to 4,
a set consisting of the associated values ai, bi, ci, and di is displayed, as it can
be seen in Figure 1.
The four buttons available in this panel implement the following functional-
ity:
{ Generate: It generates all the private elements associated to the private keys
of the users according to the step 9 of the procedure described in Section
2.1.
{ Save: It allows the user to save the private elements of the four users in a
le using an XML structure.
{ Load : It allows to overwrite the data existing in the text boxes with the
information stored in the XML le selected by the user.
{ Clear : It deletes the content of all the text boxes displayed in this panel.
3.3 Operations panel
This panel includes the operational functionality that can be accessed through
the following buttons, as displayed in Figure 1:
{ Generate: It generates the signature of the text message provided manually
by the user according to Equation (2) included in Section 2.3. In order to
obtain the elements f and g associated to the signature, it is necessary to
select in the panel the hash function and the signing user.
{ Verify : It allows to verify if the signature provided by the application user
corresponds to the text message entered in its text box. For this function-
ality, the application implements Equation (3) from Section 2.4. In order to
perform this verication, the application only uses the public data available
in the Parameters panel.
{ Disclose: By selecting this button, the application rst veries if the signa-
ture provided is correct, and then it completes the calculations that allow
the server to identify which of the four users signed the message. In order to
do this, the application implements Equation (4) included in 2.5.
{ Clear : It deletes the content of all the text boxes displayed in this panel.
4 Experimental results
The tests whose results are presented in this section were completed using a PC
with Windows 7 Professional OS and an Intel Core i7 processor at 3.40 GHz.
Table 1 includes the running time obtained when executing the general pa-
rameters generation procedure in the testing computer with the bit lengths indi-
cated in each case, where the bit length represents the maximum length in bits
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of the parameters r, p1, q1, v1, and v2. The time displayed for each bit length
represents the average time of the generation of 100 sets of parameters.
Table 1. General parameters generation running time
Length (bits) 32 64 96 128 160 192
Time (seconds) 0.30 4.24 25.21 57.19 128.83 300.57
As expected, the running time has an exponential shape, as it can be seen in
Figure 2.
Fig. 2. General parameters' generation running time
Even though the running time obtained for large bit lengths is considerable,
it is important to point out that the process of generating the general parameters
is executed only once during the life cycle of that set of parameters. In the rest
of operations (signature generation and verication, and signature disclosure)
the running time obtained is less than 5 milliseconds even for parameters of 192
bits.
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5 Conclusions
In this contribution we present a modication of the rst group signature scheme
described in [18]. In order to implement the scheme as a Java application, we
have modied the scheme by adding a new requirement which mandates v1 and
v2 to be both prime numbers, as explained in x2.1. With this modication, we
force the number of non-trivial divisors of (n) to be exactly 62, which facilitates
the implementation in devices with limited resources as the application does not
need to factor v1 and v2 in order to determine the actual number of non-trivial
divisors of (n).
The tests performed with the application allow us to conrm the expected
diculty in generating the system parameters for bit lengths greater than 64
bits. Nevertheless, as the system parameters generation procedure is only exe-
cuted once by the PKC, it is not a limitation for deploying the group signature
service in devices with limited resources, as they must only perform the signature
generation and verication procedures.
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